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AN OVERVIEW OF ASSIGNMENTS AND SUBLEASES OF
MINERAL LEASES AND THE MOST-FAVORED NATION
CLAUSE: HOOVER TREE FARM, L.L.C. V. GOODRICH
PETROLEUM COMPANY, L.L.C.
Marion Peter Roy, III *
Oil and Gas lessees have long assigned and subleased all or
part of their interests in those leases to third parties. While much
early Louisiana jurisprudence in the area centered merely on
identifying the language that distinguishes assignments from
subleases, and on analyzing the legal effects of that difference, the
importance of correctly assessing the relationship either between
lessee and assignee or between lessee and sublessee takes on an
even more significant meaning when examining the issue through
the lens of an existing so-called “most-favored nation clause”
(hereinafter “MFN clause”) in the original oil and gas lease. In the
fervent rush to secure leasehold acreage in a profitable shale “play”
(such as the Haynesville shale of North Louisiana, the area at issue
in this case), many exploration and production (hereinafter E&P)
companies eventually pay exponentially more both in per-acre
bonus amounts and royalty percentage amounts in lease
conveyances than did the original E&P company party to the lease
as a lessee. Usually, this common form of speculation creates no
additional payments owed to the lessor. However, as it will be seen
in the coming discussion of Hoover Tree Farm v. Goodrich
Petroleum, 1 a lease containing an MFN clause serves to place
liability in solido both on the original lessee and the transferee,
obliging them together to compensate the lessor the amount in
* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2014), Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. Special Thanks to Prof. Olivier Moréteau for support
and suggestions and to Daniel On for editing.
1. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 46,153
(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/23/11), 63 So. 3d 159.
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difference between the price of the original lease and that of the
partial assignment, both in per-acre bonus and royalty percentage
payments, if in fact the transfer at issue is deemed to be an
assignment rather than a sublease, or if the two lessees may be
deemed to be “co-owners” of the lease.
I. BACKGROUND
Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. (“Hoover”) leased 317 acres of land
in Caddo Parish to Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C.
(“Goodrich”) in 2008, for whom Petroleo Properties, L.L.C.
(“Petroleo”) acted as a broker in negotiating the lease. The final
negotiated terms of the Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease 2 granted
Hoover a 25% royalty and a $1,000 per acre lease bonus. 3 After
early revisions of the MFN clause by Hoover’s attorney, its final
version, and the source of this case’s litigation, provides as
follows:
Lessee and Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., which
joins herein, each guarantee that no lessor of either Lessee
or Goodrich Petroleum or their successors and assigns shall
receive a higher royalty and/or bonus than the Lessor under
this Lease. Should any lessor receive such higher bonus
and/or royalty, the Lessor under this Lease shall receive
from Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C. the difference
between the higher bonus and the bonus paid to Lessor at
the inception of this Lease, and the difference between the
higher royalty and the royalty paid to Lessor under this
Lease. This clause will remain in effect separately with
respect to each Section covered by this Lease, and with
respect to each such Section, this clause will remain in full
force and effect until the end of the Primary Term of this
Lease. This clause covers every lease which may be made
by Lessee, Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., Sendero
2. Id. at 161-62.
3. While the lease initially listed Petroleo, L.L.C. as the Lessee, paragraph
27 of the Lease clearly provides that Goodrich is to be deemed the original
Lessee since it was always Petroleo’s intent as broker to assign the lease to
Goodrich. On May 7, 2008, Petroleo assigned to Goodrich “all of the Assignor’s
right, title and interest” in and to the lease. See Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162, n.4.
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Resources Incorporated and/or Caddo Resources LP, as
Lessee, and their respective successors and assigns, in any
section in any of the following townships and ranges in
Caddo Parish, Louisiana: (19N–16W), (19N–15W), (18N–
16W), and (18N–15W). 4
On June 6, 2008, Goodrich and Chesapeake Louisiana, LP
(“Chesapeake”) executed an “Assignment, Conveyance, and Bill
of Sale,” in which Goodrich “Granted, Sold, Assigned, Conveyed,
and Delivered” to Chesapeake an undivided 50% interest in the
Hoover lease and other leases to all depths below the “Cotton
Valley Formation.” The transfer did not contain any forms of
payment that resembled an overriding royalty for Goodrich. 5 Soon
after this agreement, Chesapeake acquired other oil and gas leases
(“third party leases”) in the area within the established bounds of
the Hoover lease’s MFN clause for a counter-performance of
$25,000 per acre bonus payments and a 30% lease royalty. Hoover
then filed suit against Petroleo, Goodrich, and Chesapeake,
asserting these third party leases triggered application of the MFN
clause in its own lease. Hoover contended that, because
Chesapeake was an “assign” of Goodrich and entered into other
mineral leases in the range covered by the lease’s MFN clause, it
(Hoover) is owed the difference between the bonus and royalty it
received initially and the amount of bonus and royalty Chesapeake
paid for the third party leases. Hoover’s September 28, 2009
Motion for Summary Judgment sought $7,608,000 (317 acres x
$24,000) and a 30% royalty. In response, Chesapeake’s and
Goodrich’s opposing summary judgments asserted the transfer
between them was a sublease rather than an assignment, thereby
not triggering the MFN clause. In the alternative, Chesapeake also
contended that even if the clause would be deemed to come into
effect, that Goodrich alone would be liable for breach of the
clause. 6
4. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162.
5. Id. at 162.
6. Id. at 163-64.
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The trial court, after receiving the arguments from all
parties, granted Hoover’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding
that the transfer between Goodrich and Chesapeake was an
assignment and that the MFN clause’s application would be
allowed because of Chesapeake’s third party lease acquisitions.
The court thus increased the Hoover royalty to 30%, denied
Goodrich’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted
Chesapeake’s summary judgment, holding that Goodrich was the
only party accountable for the higher bonus under the Hoover
lease’s MFN clause. Hoover and Goodrich both appealed
following the judgment; Hoover also sought to hold Chesapeake
liable along with Goodrich for the $7.6 million judgment in its
favor. 7
II. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, amended
the lower court’s judgment, affirming in part and reversing in part,
holding that Chesapeake was obligated in solido with Goodrich to
satisfy the higher bonus payment under the most-favored nation
clause, 8 and that the transfer executed between Chesapeake and
Goodrich was an assignment rather than a sublease. 9 Despite the
court’s recognition of the fact that the case’s primary issue is the
interpretation of the MFN clause, it nevertheless first addresses the
issue of the in solido obligation of both Goodrich and Chesapeake
7. Id. at 164.
8. See the block quotation supra for the exact terms of the most-favored
nation clause at issue in this case. While there are many available published
attempts to precisely define MFN clauses as they are modernly used, the exact
definition depends upon the circumstances in which they are employed and the
type of obligations they modify. A basic MFN clause definition is as follows: “a
contractual agreement between a buyer and a seller that the price paid by the
buyer will be at least as low as the price paid by other buyers who purchase the
same commodities from the seller.” Arnold Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of
Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts between Health Care Providers and
Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863, 864 (1991). In the instant case, the MFN clause
provides that the lessor will receive the highest prices paid by other lessees
within a strictly defined geographic area of mineral exploration.
9. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 181.
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(with regards to their having to pay the $7.6 million). After briefly
but clearly noting that mineral leases are real rights governed by
Louisiana’s Mineral Code, 10 the court states that Article 128 11
provides that the assignees or sublessees acquire the rights and
powers of the original lessee to the extent conveyed by the partial
assignment or sublease. Noting the lower court’s inconsistency in
holding that Goodrich alone was liable under the judgment, but
also somehow holding that both Goodrich and Chesapeake would
be jointly affected by the lease’s royalty obligation increasing for
30%, the appellate court rejected the notion that Goodrich is solely
liable for the payment of the $7.6 million judgment to Hoover. The
court thus held that since Article 128 makes clear that both
Goodrich and Chesapeake are co-owners of the lease’s operational
rights, that both companies are therefore liable for payment to
Hoover. 12
Regarding the appeal’s principal issue (whether the transfer
between Goodrich and Chesapeake was an assignment or
sublease), the court provides a thorough jurisprudential history of
the long-litigated difference between the two forms of lease
conveyances, starting with a basic examination of the importance
of a contract’s interpretation being clear and unambiguous, if
possible. 13 Eventually, the court outlines the Civil Code’s
definitions for successors and assigns, concluding that within the
meaning of Civil Code article 3506, 14 Chesapeake was an assign of
Goodrich; however, since the transaction involved a mineral lease,
the court further examines the unique law and Louisiana
jurisprudence surrounding subleases and assignments as they
pertain to mineral leases. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court
has decided many cases on the issue, the most important cases, and
10.
11.
(2012).
12.
13.
14.

See, generally, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31 (2012).
Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 163. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:128
Hoover, 63 So .3d at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 170. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506.
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the two which this court considers the most,15 are Roberson v.
Pioneer Gas Co 16 and Smith v. Sun Oil. 17 Noting the
inconsistencies in jurisprudence because of a lack of the code’s
guidance on the issue, the court holds that the “lease upon a lease”
concept as first presented in Sun Oil became relaxed and
broadened to mean that the sublease test became “any retained
measure”—that is, for a sublease to exist, the transferor has to
retain a “measure,” now commonly called an “override,” of the
original lease. Importantly, the court states in dicta in footnote 20
that “we have not uncovered a Louisiana decision where a tenant
conveyed an undivided interest in his lease and became faced with
the claim that a sublease had occurred.” 18 The court again
reiterates that in all prior cases involving the transfer of an
undivided interest in a mineral lease, such as what happened
between Goodrich and Chesapeake, courts have not found the
transfers to be subleases. 19 Thus, despite both Chesapeake’s and
Goodrich’s claims that their transfer was a sublease, the court
holds that “we cannot find that the Transfer from Goodrich to
Chesapeake was a sublease, causing them to be in a
sublessor/sublessee relationship.” 20
However, after this thorough legal and jurisprudential
framework of the assignment vs. sublease realm, the court seems to
shift entirely to a separate (if related) legal topic—co-ownership.
Ultimately, despite definitively declaring the transfer as an
assignment, the court declares “the relationship between Goodrich
and Chesapeake after the transfer falls squarely within the
Louisiana Law of co-ownership.” 21 Therefore, the assignment of
the leasehold rights to Chesapeake made it responsible directly to
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 175-76.
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931).
Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379 (La. 1928).
Hoover, 65 So. 3d at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 179.
Id.
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the original lessor, Hoover. 22 In the final analysis, the court’s
holding seems to hinge more on the finding that Chesapeake and
Goodrich were co-owners of the lease, rather than on the finding
that Chesapeake was an assignee instead of a sublessee after the
transfer. Both findings, however, are clearly stated in the reasons
given by the court. 23
III. COMMENTARY
This brief commentary will argue that the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals made the correct holding regarding both the MFN
clause issue and the assignment/sublease issue present in Hoover
Tree Farm v. Goodrich Petroleum Company, but that it was
unnecessary, superfluous, and confusing for the court to cite the
law of co-ownership at the end of its discussion in support of its
holding. Put simply, the court arrived at the correct holding after it
accurately concluded that, since Chesapeake was a partial assignee
in the lease transfer, Chesapeake along with Goodrich were liable
to Hoover—the court should have concluded the opinion following
assignment/sublease analysis instead of proceeding to discuss coownership as well. While some of the points of this commentary’s
straightforward argument are perhaps touched upon in the court’s
discussion, the argument infra attempts to lay out a simpler, more
direct means of getting to the same, correct holding(s) as did the
court in its opinion.
Article 114 of the Mineral Code provides that “a mineral lease
is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to explore for
and produce minerals.” 24 While the Mineral Code makes
abundantly clear that the mineral lease is notably different than
most other contracts in that it creates a real right (rather than a

22. Id. at 180.
23. Id.
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114 (2012) (emphasis added).
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personal obligation), 25 a mineral lease is nevertheless a legally
effective agreement between parties, regulating rights and
obligations like any other personal contract. 26 Accordingly, the
interpretation of mineral leases operates exactly like that of any
other contract: the words used in the lease are to be given their
prevailing meaning (unless they are words of art or technical), 27
and no further interpretation should be made in search of the
parties’ intent if the lease’s words are “clear, explicit, and lead to
no absurd consequences.” 28 In this case, the disputed clause in the
original lease between Hoover and Goodrich, and the initial reason
for the litigation, is its most-favored nation clause. The first
sentence of the MFN clause clearly and unambiguously states that
Goodrich “guarantee[s] that no lessor or lessee of either entity or
their successors and assigns shall receive a higher royalty and/or
bonus than the Lessor under this Lease.” 29 The concluding
sentence provides clearly and unambiguously that the clause
covers every lease within a specified geographic range made by
Goodrich and their respective successors and assigns. 30 If,
therefore, in conjunction with the language from the abovementioned civil code articles discussing contract language
interpretation, the terms in this MFN clause can be given their
prevailing meaning, no further interpretation of the clause is
necessary if that interpretation does not lead to absurd
consequences. Here, then, if Chesapeake can be deemed an
“assign” of Goodrich, the MFN is therefore triggered, and
Chesapeake as an assign would be liable for payment along with
Goodrich for that guarantee of the difference of bonus and royalty
amounts to the lessor, Hoover.
25. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2012). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:18 (2012).
26. See, generally, Stephenson v Petrohawk Properties, L.P., 37 So. 3d 1145
(La. App. Ct. 2d 2010); Winnon v Davis 759 So. 2d 321 (La. App. Ct. 2d 2000).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2047 (2012).
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (2012).
29. Hoover, 65 So. 3d at 162 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
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Determining whether Chesapeake is a partial assignee, and
therefore liable in solido with Goodrich, or a sublessee, and
therefore not liable, involves a slightly more complex and involved
analysis than that of the interpretation of the language of the MFN
clause. However, it quickly becomes clear after reading the
Mineral Code, relevant jurisprudence, 31 and secondary sources 32
that it is highly unlikely that this transfer between Goodrich and
Chesapeake would make the latter a sublessee rather than an
assignee. In the law of mineral leases in Louisiana, a unifying trait
present in subleases, and not in assignments, is the presence of a
reservation of an interest of some kind by the original lessee; an
assignment of a lease, however, is generally viewed merely as a
kind of sale of all or part of the lease. 33 The distinction is wellestablished through several decades of the development of
Louisiana oil and gas law 34 and is clearly laid out in this excerpt
from Leslie Moses’ 1940 law review article on the matter:
There is a difference under the Louisiana law between an
assignment and a sublease of an oil and gas lease. An
assignment is the conveying of all or a part of the entire
lease for the whole of the unexpired term. The assignee
secures the same interest that his assignor had at the time of
31. Mire v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 285 F. Supp. 885, 890 (W.D. La. 1968):
There is a sharp distinction between an assignment of a lease and a
sublease, recognized in the jurisprudence. In the case of a sublease a
new and, in a sense, separate contractual relationship of lease exists
between the original lessee and the sublessee. There can be no actions
on the contract between the original lessor and the sublessee because
there is no privity between them; there are two contracts, the original
lease and the sublease, only the original lessee is a party to both…
Where there is an assignment of the lease…the assignee is liable to the
original lessor for the obligations of the original lessee which he has
assumed completely. To sublease is to lease in whole or in part the
thing of which one is the lessee, with reservation of an interest in it by
the original lessee, or sublessor; while to assign a lease is to sell it
(emphasis added).
32. See generally Leslie Moses, The Distinction between a Sublease and an
Assignment of a Mineral Lease in Louisiana, 18 TEX. L. REV. 159 (1940).
33. See the emphasized portion of the quotation, supra note 31.
34. See Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 91 So. 2d 762 (La. 1956); see also
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931); Smith v. Sun Oil
Company, 116 So. 379 (La. 1928).
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the assignment. Any instrument transferring less than this,
or a part of lessee's rights or obligations under the original
lease, is a sublease.
In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary a sublease, or an underlease,
is defined as: “An alienation by a tenant of a part of his
lease, reserving to himself a reversion; it differs from an
assignment which is a transfer of all the tenant's interest in
the lease. And even a conveyance of the whole estate by the
lessee, reserving to himself the rent, with a power of
reentry for nonpayment, was held to be not an assignment
but an underlease.” 35
In the instant case, the transfer between Goodrich and
Chesapeake was an assignment, rather than a sublease, because the
terms of the transfer were such that Chesapeake received “an
undivided 50% interest in the Lease . . . as to all depths below the
Cotton Valley formation. The Transfer contained no provisions for
payment to Goodrich in the nature of an overriding royalty.” 36
Nothing about this transfer mirrors the mechanisms of a sublease,
or an “underlease” (to use the original civilian term), since
Goodrich reserved no interest or overriding royalty, as made clear
in the court’s observation quoted immediately above. Rather, this
is an assignment in which the conveyance is of “all or a part of the
entire lease for the whole of the unexpired term” 37—in this partial
assignment, the lessee transferred all the rights associated with half
of the lease’s interest. Indeed, the assignee (Chesapeake) has
secured “the same interest that his assignor had at the time of the
assignment.” 38
Thus, Chesapeake, as an assignee rather than sublessee,
should be held liable in solido with Goodrich for both the $7.6
million judgment and the higher royalty amount. The MFN clause,
read clearly and unambiguously as the language in any mineral
lease should be, was triggered when Goodrich executed the 50%
partial assignment to Chesapeake. According to Mineral Code
35.
36.
37.
38.

Moses, supra note 32, at 159-60 (citations omitted).
Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162.
Moses, supra note 32, at 159.
Id.
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Article 128, the partial assignee (Chesapeake) is directly
responsible to the lessor (Hoover). The Second Circuit thus
correctly held that Hoover shall recover from both Goodrich and
Chesapeake. The opinion, however, could have ended after the
court’s conclusion that Chesapeake is an assignee. By adding at the
end of its analysis that Chesapeake and Goodrich were co-owners
of the lease, and therefore liable in solido for that reason as well,
the Court is opening another can of worms: though the Mineral
Code provides that mineral rights are real rights, can one “own”
these rights, and therefore be co-owner of them? It is good news
that the case could be solved without answering to this tricky
question.

